IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/tjmaxx/v6y2019i2p107-134.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control under emission permit trading

Author

Listed:
  • Huiquan Li
  • Shiping Mao

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the incentive equilibrium strategies of two neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting. Our paper can be viewed as an extension of the work of Yeung [2007. Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 134, 143–160] in the context of the transboundary industrial pollution. Compared with the work of Yeung [2007. Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 134, 143–160], our research significant features (i) introduce the emission permits trading into the transboundary industrial pollution control;(ii) take into account the pollution abatement investment; (iii) examine the incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control; and (iv) design an allocation mechanism for regions’ cooperative profits. Furthermore, we illustrate the results of the paper with a numerical example. The utility of this paper is how to make incentive equilibrium strategies in a situation where the neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Huiquan Li & Shiping Mao, 2019. "Incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control under emission permit trading," Journal of Management Analytics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 107-134, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:tjmaxx:v:6:y:2019:i:2:p:107-134
    DOI: 10.1080/23270012.2019.1595187
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/23270012.2019.1595187
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/23270012.2019.1595187?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ryle S. Perera & Kimitoshi Sato, 2023. "Ensuring Mutual Benefit in a Trans-boundary Industrial Pollution Control Problem," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 62(1), pages 91-128, June.
    2. Li, Shoude & Zhang, Yingxuan, 2023. "Abatement technology innovation and pollution tax design: A dynamic analysis in monopoly," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:tjmaxx:v:6:y:2019:i:2:p:107-134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/tjma .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.