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A contract theory analysis to fiscal relations between the central and local governments in China

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  • Yutaka Suzuki

Abstract

We use a contract theory/mechanism design framework to analyse the fiscal relations and reforms between the central and local governments in China, which are said to have made great contributions to economic growth since the ‘economic reform’. First, we present the mechanism (a fiscal incentive contract model), which has created incentives for the development agent (local government), and clarify theoretically how the concept of bao (contract) works. We then comprehend the concept of bisai (contest) within the framework of the yardstick competition between local governments, and review the mechanism which encourages proper information revelation through intergovernmental comparison and competition. Lastly, we make a theoretical comparative analysis on the fiscal system reform (from the fiscal contracting system to the tax sharing system), from the perspective of how much room was left for the ‘ratchet effect’ in the dynamic relation between the central and local governments, and how it was solved (or mitigated) in the two fiscal systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Yutaka Suzuki, 2019. "A contract theory analysis to fiscal relations between the central and local governments in China," Economic and Political Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 281-313, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:repsxx:v:7:y:2019:i:3:p:281-313
    DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2019.1633822
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    Cited by:

    1. Bo, Shiyu & Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng & Wang, Boqun, 2021. "Intergovernmental communication under decentralization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 606-652.
    2. Huang, Hongyun & Wang, Fengrong & Song, Malin & Balezentis, Tomas & Streimikiene, Dalia, 2021. "Green innovations for sustainable development of China: Analysis based on the nested spatial panel models," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    3. Yutaka Suzuki, 2021. "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 22(2), pages 317-365, November.

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