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The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors

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  • Claudia Ascherl
  • Liesa Schrand
  • Wolfgang Schaefers
  • Sofia Dermisi

Abstract

The paper examines whether executive compensation packages within the US REIT industry are determined merely by performance or also by CEO power mechanisms that have an essential influence on board-level negotiations. We offer original insights into management compensation arrangements during and after the financial crisis. The relative importance of cash bonuses in CEO compensation contracts has more than halved after the crisis. Simultaneously, after the financial crisis, equity-based compensation became increasingly important. Concerning the pay-for-performance link, our results show no relationship during the financial crisis. However, after the crisis, we find a strong significant link between remuneration packages and corporate success.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia Ascherl & Liesa Schrand & Wolfgang Schaefers & Sofia Dermisi, 2019. "The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors," Journal of Property Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(4), pages 313-342, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jpropr:v:36:y:2019:i:4:p:313-342
    DOI: 10.1080/09599916.2019.1653955
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    Cited by:

    1. Artur Sajnóg & Anna Rogoziñska-Pawe³czyk, 2022. "Executive compensation and the financial performance of Polish listed companies from the corporate governance perspective," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 17(2), pages 459-480, June.
    2. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.

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