Human Development and Electoral Systems
The aim of this paper is to test whether electoral systems and human development are linked. Using high-quality data and very simple panel data econometric techniques, we show that electoral systems play a critical role in explaining the difference in the levels of human development between countries. We find that countries which have proportional systems enjoy higher levels of human development than those with majoritarian systems, thanks to more redistributive fiscal policies. We also find that when the degree of proportionality, based on the mean electoral district size, increases, so does human development.
Volume (Year): 7 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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