Limit Pricing with Incomplete Information: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions
Strategic pricing is an important and exciting topic in industrial organization and the economics of strategy. A wide range of texts use what has become a standard version of the Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) limit-pricing model to convey the essential ideas of strategic pricing under incomplete information. In addition to providing a formal, but succinct, review of the standard model, the author addresses three questions that commonly arise when the model is presented to students: What happens if there are more than two periods. What if information is still incomplete in the postentry subgame. What if the incumbent does not know the entrant's beliefs. The author shows that, although there are some interesting behavioral implications, none of these extensions significantly changes the conclusions of the basic model.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/VECE20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/VECE20|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:jeduce:v:35:y:2004:i:1:p:62-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.