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Player heterogeneity and empiricism in Schelling

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  • Alessandro Innocenti

Abstract

The main thesis of this paper is that Schelling's empiricism is deeply grounded in the assumption of player heterogeneity. He peoples games with real individuals and consequently postulates that there are differences in roles or identities among them. The subjects populating Schelling's thought or real experiments do not suppose that other players follow identical or symmetrical rules of logical inference to make their choices. This hypothesis is decisive in shaping Schelling's inductive game theory, which is applied by means of a three-step procedure. First, players are defined by making their differentiating features explicit. Secondly, heterogeneous players are embedded in a real environment to play the game. Thirdly, the game solution is derived inductively. This interpretation helps to explain why little progress has been made overall in developing Schelling's insights.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Innocenti, 2007. "Player heterogeneity and empiricism in Schelling," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 409-428.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:14:y:2007:i:4:p:409-428
    DOI: 10.1080/13501780701718649
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    Cited by:

    1. Lauren Larrouy, 2015. "Revisiting Methodological Individualism in Game Theory: The Contributions of Schelling and Bacharach," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-14, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    2. Correa Romar, 2014. "Mathematical Foci," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1-2), pages 1-7, August.
    3. Lauren Larrouy, 2015. "The Ontology of Schelling's "Theory of Interdependent Decisions"," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-38, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

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