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The malicious host: a minimax solution of the Monty Hall problem


  • Jan C. Schuller


The classic solution of the Monty Hall problem tacitly assumes that, after the candidate made his/her first choice, the host always allows the candidate to switch doors after he/she showed to the candidate a losing door, not initially chosen by the candidate. In view of actual TV shows, it seems a more credible assumption that the host will or will not allow switching. Under this assumption, possible strategies for the candidate are discussed, with respect to a minimax solution of the problem. In conclusion, the classic solution does not necessarily provide a good guidance for a candidate on a game show. It is discussed that the popularity of the problem is due to its incompleteness.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan C. Schuller, 2012. "The malicious host: a minimax solution of the Monty Hall problem," Journal of Applied Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(1), pages 215-221, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:japsta:v:39:y:2012:i:1:p:215-221
    DOI: 10.1080/02664763.2011.580337

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Peter R. Mueser & Donald Granberg, 1999. "The Monty Hall Dilemma Revisited: Understanding the Interaction of Problem Definition and Decision Making," Experimental 9906001, EconWPA.
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