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Monitoring Policy and Organizational Forms in Franchised Chains

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  • Thierry Pénard
  • Emmanuel Raynaud
  • Stéphane Saussier

Abstract

Franchising is nowadays a prominent way to organize the distribution sector. While previous literature suggests that monitoring issues are a critical determinant of organizational choices, it is rather silent on the optimal monitoring strategy once the organization of the chain is set. In this article, we analyze the monitoring policy of chains with both franchised and company-owned units. We develop a model in which a chain monitors its outlets under asymmetric information on local demands and managers’ efforts. We show that partial monitoring (i.e., when the franchisor monitors only a subset of its outlets) represents an optimal monitoring policy. Second, we identify the units that should be monitored. Finally, we discuss the impact of information technologies and outlet location on monitoring policy and how it may affect the proportion of franchised and company-owned units within the mixed chains.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Pénard & Emmanuel Raynaud & Stéphane Saussier, 2011. "Monitoring Policy and Organizational Forms in Franchised Chains," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(3), pages 399-417, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:18:y:2011:i:3:p:399-417 DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2011.618613
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cintya Lanchimba, 2013. "Optimal Monetary Provisions in Plural Form Franchise Systems ; A Theoretical Model of Incentives with Two Risk-Averse Agents," Working Papers 1321, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    2. Cintya Lanchimba, 2013. "Optimal Monetary Provisions in Plural Form Franchise Systems; A Theoretical Model of Incentives with Two Risk-Averse Agents," Working Papers halshs-00830899, HAL.
    3. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba Lopez, 2012. "Performance in distribution systems : What is the influence of the upstream firm’s organizational choices ?," Working Papers 1224, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba, 2012. "Performance in distribution systems : What is the influence of the upstream firm's organizational choices ?," Working Papers halshs-00727382, HAL.
    5. Josef Windsperger, 2013. "The governance of franchising networks," Chapters,in: Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 27 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Joan Crespo & Raphaël Suire & Jérôme Vicente, 2016. "Network structural properties for cluster long-run dynamics: evidence from collaborative R&D networks in the European mobile phone industry," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, pages 261-282.
    7. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba, 2012. "Signaling the value of a business concept : Evidence from a structural model with Brazilian franchising data," Working Papers halshs-00735573, HAL.
    8. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba Lopez, 2012. "Signaling the value of a business concept : Evidence from a structural model with Brazilian franchising data," Working Papers 1228, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

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