IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/gmasxx/v43y2019i4p195-212.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Group Extinction in Iterated Two Person Games with Evolved Group-Level Mixed Strategies

Author

Listed:
  • R. A. W. Bradford

Abstract

The shift to a genetic basis of evolution in the 1960s, and away from group selection, created a problem in regard to the origin of cooperative behavior in human societies. The resolution essentially involves mutual recognition of individuals, thus permitting the phenomena of reputation, reciprocation, and retribution to arise, these being key to stable cooperative societies. The analysis presented, based on evolutionary game theory, serves to emphasize the crucial role of individual recognition by illustrating the consequences of assuming the opposite. It is shown that where tribal membership is apparent, but individuals are not recognizable, evolving mistrust leads to tribal extinction in an evolutionary game theory model. Moreover, a single tribe is also unstable to schism. Subsequently, the extinction of one schismatic group occurs. Failure to recognize individuals therefore facilitates a mechanism which leads to increasing conformity.

Suggested Citation

  • R. A. W. Bradford, 2019. "Group Extinction in Iterated Two Person Games with Evolved Group-Level Mixed Strategies," The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 195-212, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:gmasxx:v:43:y:2019:i:4:p:195-212
    DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2019.1602045
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/0022250X.2019.1602045
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/0022250X.2019.1602045?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:gmasxx:v:43:y:2019:i:4:p:195-212. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/gmas .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.