Interstate rivalry, major power status, and state support for arms control

In this study, I argue that rivalries with major powers decrease non-major powers’ support for arms control. This is because major powers are able to shape arms control negotiations in their favor, thereby avoiding restrictions to their own armament while imposing heavier limitations on their rivals. Therefore, the costs of arms control (i.e., restrictions to their own armament) tend to outweigh the benefits (i.e., restrictions to their rival’s armament) for non-major powers in rivalries with major powers. In contrast, for major powers, a rivalry with another major power increases both the costs and benefits of arms control and does not substantially affect their arms control support. I investigate my argument in a quantitative analysis, using a new measure of state support for arms control that combines voting data from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with manual coding of 1,178 resolutions adopted during the post-Cold War period. I find a negative relationship between rivalries with major powers and arms control support, but only among non-major powers. This finding illustrates the crucial role of power relations in arms control negotiations and sheds new light on the relationship between rivalries and arms control, as well as on international politics in general.