Author
Abstract
What are the international and domestic effects of low credibility false flag incidents? One way in which wars occasionally start (as in the case of the 2022 Ukraine war) is with false flag incidents- the war-seeking state staging one or more attacks on their own side, blaming the would-be target country for them, and then using the staged attacks as a casus belli for war. Such attacks are meant to reduce the costs of war to the war-seeking state by making the target country seem as the initiator. However, the low credibility of many such false flag incidents puts in question what gains war-seeking states usually make from these incidents. This paper, using a set of survey experiments, begins to examine what benefits, if any, such false flag incidents bring to the war-seeking state. Third party publics are more likely to approve of war-seeking countries after low credibility false flag incidents and are less likely to support the imposition of sanctions on them. However, among many domestic publics (such as the American one) such false flag attacks are ineffective, and even counterproductive, due to the low levels of trust much of the public has in its own government.RésuméQuels sont les effets internationaux et nationaux des incidents impliquant de fausses bannières et peu crédibles ? Parfois, les guerres commencent à cause d’incidents impliquant de fausses bannières (comme dans le cas de la guerre en Ukraine en 2022) : l’État cherchant la guerre met en scène au moins une attaque de son côté, en jette le blâme sur le pays cible, puis utilise ces fausses attaques comme un casus belli pour une guerre. Ces attaques devraient réduire le coût de la guerre pour l’État qui la recherche en faisant passer le pays cible pour l’initiateur. Cependant, la faible crédibilité de nombre de ces incidents aux fausses bannières remet en question les gains que les États cherchant la guerre en retirent généralement. À l’aide d’un ensemble d’expériences de sondage, cet article commence à examiner les avantages, le cas échéant, que ces incidents impliquant de fausses bannières apportent à l’État cherchant la guerre. Les publics tiers ont davantage de chances d’approuver le comportement des États cherchant la guerre après un recours à de tels incidents peu crédibles aux fausses bannières que de soutenir l’imposition de sanctions à leur encontre. Néanmoins, chez de nombreux publics nationaux (comme le public américain), ces attaques sous fausse bannière se révèlent inefficaces, et même contre-productives, à cause du faible niveau de confiance qu’une grande partie de la population ressent à l’égard de son propre gouvernement.Resumen¿Cuáles son los efectos, a nivel internacional y nacional, de los incidentes de falsa bandera con baja credibilidad? Una de las formas por las que, ocasionalmente, comienzan las guerras (como en el caso de la guerra de Ucrania de 2022) es debido a incidentes de falsa bandera, es decir, el Estado que busca la guerra organiza uno o más ataques en su propio bando, culpando de ellos al posible país objetivo y luego usa los ataques escenificados como un casus belli (motivo de guerra). Estos ataques están destinados a reducir los costes de la guerra para el Estado que busca la guerra, haciendo que el país objetivo parezca el iniciador. Sin embargo, la baja credibilidad que tienen muchos de estos incidentes de falsa bandera pone en tela de juicio las ganancias que los Estados que buscan la guerra suelen obtener de estos incidentes. Este artículo utiliza un conjunto de experimentos de encuestas que nos permite comenzar a analizar qué beneficios, si es que los hay, aportan tales incidentes de falsa bandera al Estado que busca la guerra. Es más probable que el público de terceros países dé su aprobación a los países que buscan la guerra después de utilizar incidentes de falsa bandera de baja credibilidad o que apoye la imposición de sanciones contra ellos. Sin embargo, entre muchos públicos nacionales (como, por ejemplo, el público estadounidense) estos ataques de falsa bandera resultan ineficaces, e incluso contraproducentes, debido a los bajos niveles de confianza que gran parte del público tiene en su propio Gobierno.
Suggested Citation
Dov H. Levin, 2025.
"How Low Can You Go? The Effects of Low Credibility False Flag Incidents on International and Domestic Approval for Interstate Wars1,"
International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(3), pages 425-454, May.
Handle:
RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:51:y:2025:i:3:p:425-454
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2025.2489366
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:51:y:2025:i:3:p:425-454. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GINI20 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.