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Burden sharing in UN peacekeeping operations: Who deploys to violent locations?

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  • Jared Oestman

Abstract

Which countries deploy troops to violent locations within UN peacekeeping operations? Troop contributing countries face different incentives to participate in peacekeeping operations. These motivating factors should also condition their willingness to take on risks to implement mission mandates. I argue that states motivated to ensure the effectiveness of an operation as well as states that expect to receive private gains by deploying to riskier locales within missions will send more of their troops to these areas. In contrast, states with leaders that are more sensitive to the potential costs associated with riskier commitments will be less willing to send their service members to violent locations. Results from an analysis of spatially disaggregated data across 23 UN missions from 1994 to 2015 support these expectations. States hosting refugees from a mission location tend to deploy more troops to local areas that experience major violent episodes. States that generate greater benefits to their militaries through their involvement in peacekeeping also provide more troops to these areas. In contrast, democratic contributors send fewer troops to violent locations. The results further reveal important disparities in troop deployments within UN peacekeeping operations.¿Qué países despliegan tropas en áreas violentas dentro del marco de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU? Los países que aportan contingentes cuentan con diferentes incentivos para participar en las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz. Estos factores motivadores también pueden condicionar su disposición a asumir riesgos durante la ejecución de los mandatos de las misiones. Sostenemos que aquellos Estados que estén motivados en garantizar la efectividad de una operación y aquellos Estados que esperen recibir beneficios privados debido a su despliegue en áreas más arriesgadas dentro de las misiones, son los que enviarán una mayor proporción de sus tropas a estas áreas. En contraposición, aquellos Estados cuyos líderes son más sensibles a los costes potenciales asociados a los compromisos más arriesgados, tendrán una menor disposición a enviar a sus miembros fuerzas armadas a áreas violentas. Los resultados obtenidos de un análisis de datos desglosados espacialmente de 23 misiones de la ONU entre 1994 y 2015 ofrecen respaldo a estas expectativas. Los Estados que acogen a refugiados desde un emplazamiento de misión tienden a desplegar más tropas en las áreas locales en las que tienen lugar episodios violentos importantes. Los Estados que generan mayores beneficios a sus fuerzas armadas a través de su participación en el mantenimiento de la paz también proporcionan más tropas a estas áreas. En contraposición, los contribuyentes democráticos envían menos tropas a las áreas violentas. Los resultados revelan, además, importantes disparidades en el despliegue de tropas dentro de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU.Quels sont les pays qui déploient des troupes dans les zones de conflits où interviennent les opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU ? Les pays qui fournissent des troupes participent aux opérations de maintien de la paix pour différentes raisons. Ces motivations s’accompagnent logiquement de conséquences quand il s’agit de prendre des risques pour mettre en œuvre des mandats de mission. Selon moi, les États qui souhaitent garantir l’efficacité d’une opération, mais aussi ceux qui agissent dans leur propre intérêt en déployant des forces sur les lieux d’intervention les plus risqués des missions, enverront davantage de troupes dans ces zones. À l’inverse, les États plus sensibles aux coûts potentiels des engagements plus risqués seront moins enclins à envoyer leurs militaires dans les zones de violence. Les résultats d’une analyse de données ventilées dans l’espace issues de 23 missions de l’ONU de 1994 à 2015 viennent étayer cette hypothèse. Quand un État accueille des réfugiés provenant d’un lieu d’intervention d’une mission, il a tendance à déployer davantage de troupes sur les zones qui subissent des épisodes de violence importants. Les États dont les armées bénéficient davantage de leur engagement dans le maintien de la paix fourniront aussi davantage de troupes pour ces lieux. À l’opposé, les contributeurs démocratiques envoient moins de troupes dans les zones de violence. D’après les résultats, il existe encore d’autres disparités importantes dans le déploiement de troupes dans le cadre des opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU.

Suggested Citation

  • Jared Oestman, 2023. "Burden sharing in UN peacekeeping operations: Who deploys to violent locations?," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(4), pages 497-524, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:497-524
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2185235
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