IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/eujhet/v28y2021i5p811-843.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Central bank independence, a not so new idea in the history of economic thought: a doctrine in the 1920s

Author

Listed:
  • Adriano do Vale

Abstract

Central bank independence (CBI) has been a prominent topic for decades, but remains relatively unexplored in the history of economic thought. Relevant literature is scarce and focuses on the post-war period. To extend this literature, I argue that there was a doctrine of CBI in the 1920s. I examine its development from an international recommendation and a principle of the central banking doctrine designed by the British governor Norman to the elaborate doctrine of Kisch & Elkin. The paper’s main contribution is a detailed analysis of the doctrine of CBI provided in their reference book on central banking.

Suggested Citation

  • Adriano do Vale, 2021. "Central bank independence, a not so new idea in the history of economic thought: a doctrine in the 1920s," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(5), pages 811-843, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:28:y:2021:i:5:p:811-843
    DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2021.1908393
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09672567.2021.1908393
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09672567.2021.1908393?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:28:y:2021:i:5:p:811-843. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/REJH20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.