IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/edecon/v28y2020i5p491-507.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Finnish polytechnics reject top applicants

Author

Listed:
  • Kristian Koerselman

Abstract

I use a panel of higher education clearinghouse data to study the centralized assignment of applicants to Finnish polytechnics. Many top applicants remain completely unassigned each year. The same applicants' future applications reveal that many of them should have been admitted to a different program immediately. The application system, however, discourages applicants from applying to multiple programs within the same year, while at the same time leaving them in the dark on the set of programs willing to admit them. Improvements to the application system have the potential to substantially reduce reapplications, thereby shortening long queues into Finnish higher education.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristian Koerselman, 2020. "Why Finnish polytechnics reject top applicants," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(5), pages 491-507, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:edecon:v:28:y:2020:i:5:p:491-507
    DOI: 10.1080/09645292.2020.1787953
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09645292.2020.1787953
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09645292.2020.1787953?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Federico Echenique & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2015. "How to Control Controlled School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2679-2694, August.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
    4. Caroline Hoxby & Christopher Avery, 2013. "The Missing "One-Offs": The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving, Low-Income Students," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 44(1 (Spring), pages 1-65.
    5. Koerselman, Kristian & Uusitalo, Roope, 2014. "The risk and return of human capital investments," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 154-163.
    6. Eleanor Wiske Dillon & Jeffrey Andrew Smith, 2017. "Determinants of the Match between Student Ability and College Quality," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 45-66.
    7. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
    8. Hämäläinen, Ulla & Koerselman, Kristian & Uusitalo, Roope, 2017. "Graduation Incentives Through Conditional Student Loan Forgiveness," IZA Discussion Papers 11142, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Itai Ashlagi & Yash Kanoria & Jacob D. Leshno, 2017. "Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 69-98.
    10. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
    11. Caroline M. Hoxby & Sarah Turner, 2015. "What High-Achieving Low-Income Students Know about College," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 514-517, May.
    12. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
    13. Holzman, Ron & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 277-285.
    14. Cohn, Elchanan & Cohn, Sharon & Balch, Donald C. & Bradley, James Jr., 2004. "Determinants of undergraduate GPAs: SAT scores, high-school GPA and high-school rank," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 577-586, December.
    15. Honoré,Bo & Pakes,Ariel & Piazzesi,Monika & Samuelson,Larry (ed.), 2017. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316510520.
    16. Stephen Machin & Sandra McNally, 2005. "Gender and Student Achievement in English Schools," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(3), pages 357-372, Autumn.
    17. Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2014. "Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 196-215.
    18. Susan Dynarski & C.J. Libassi & Katherine Michelmore & Stephanie Owen, 2018. "Closing the Gap: The Effect of a Targeted, Tuition-Free Promise on College Choices of High-Achieving, Low-Income Students," NBER Working Papers 25349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Honoré,Bo & Pakes,Ariel & Piazzesi,Monika & Samuelson,Larry (ed.), 2017. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108400022.
    20. Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2015. "Self-Selection in School Choice," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-52, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    21. Honoré,Bo & Pakes,Ariel & Piazzesi,Monika & Samuelson,Larry (ed.), 2017. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108400008.
    22. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    23. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.
    24. Honoré,Bo & Pakes,Ariel & Piazzesi,Monika & Samuelson,Larry (ed.), 2017. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108414982.
    25. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, 2016. "A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1235-1268.
    26. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    27. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    28. Umut Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2018. "Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(6), pages 2457-2479.
    29. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dur, Umut & Pathak, Parag A. & Sönmez, Tayfun, 2020. "Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    2. Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020. "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 453-481.
    3. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito & Narita, Yusuke, 2016. "Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 186-211.
    4. Ha, Wei & Kang, Le & Song, Yang, 2020. "College matching mechanisms and matching stability: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 206-226.
    5. Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, 2020. "Optimizing for Distributional Goals in School Choice Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3657-3676, August.
    6. Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
    7. Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2020. "Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-21.
    8. Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021. "Market Design," NBER Working Papers 29367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
    10. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1035, Boston College Department of Economics.
    11. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    12. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2021. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process," Papers 2106.06582, arXiv.org.
    13. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    14. Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels, 2021. "Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5317-5348, September.
    15. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    16. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
    17. Yun Liu, 2017. "On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 121-151, June.
    18. Jaimie W. Lien & Jie Zheng & Xiaohan Zhong, 2016. "Preference submission timing in school choice matching: testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(1), pages 116-150, March.
    19. Li, Mengling, 2020. "Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 354-384.
    20. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2017. "Fair student placement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 293-307, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:edecon:v:28:y:2020:i:5:p:491-507. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CEDE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.