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The Political Economy of Russian Gubernatorial Election and Appointment


  • Noah Buckley
  • Timothy Frye
  • Guzel Garifullina
  • Ora John Reuter


Political and economic outcomes depend, in part, on the quality of the officials making policy. Some argue that free elections are the best method for selecting competent officials. Others argue that elections lead to the selection of amateurs and demagogues. We use original data on the biographies of Russian regional governors to examine the backgrounds of elected and appointed governors. Elected governors are more likely to be locals. Appointed governors are more likely to be federal bureaucrats or hold a graduate degree. We conclude the paper by speculating on other possible explanations for variation in governor background.

Suggested Citation

  • Noah Buckley & Timothy Frye & Guzel Garifullina & Ora John Reuter, 2014. "The Political Economy of Russian Gubernatorial Election and Appointment," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 66(8), pages 1213-1233, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ceasxx:v:66:y:2014:i:8:p:1213-1233
    DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2014.941695

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