The strategic behavior of Chinese enterprises using R&D subsidies: game model and empirical research

This paper constructs a game model of the strategic behavior of enterprises using R&D subsidies and government supervision and decision-making under the condition of information asymmetry. The derivation of the model shows that when a company and the government engage in a short-term single game, the more abundant the company’s own funds and the higher the rate of return of non-subsidized projects, the greater the possibility that the company will embezzle R&D subsidies with higher the embezzlement ratio. The simultaneous implementation of R&D subsidy policies and tax incentives will weaken the government’s enthusiasm for the supervision of enterprises and increase the possibility of enterprises embezzling R&D subsidies. For the empirical analysis, based on the data of industrial enterprises, the propensity score matching method is used to construct the proxy variables of corporate appropriation and non-innovative project profitability, When the research hypothesis from the theoretical part of this paper is tested, it is found that the profit rate of self-owned funds and non-innovative projects is the main factor affecting whether a company will embezzle subsidies. The results show an inverted U-shaped relationship, indicating that the greater the possibility of enterprises embezzling R&D subsidies, the more restrained the R&D investment of enterprises will be.