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Executive shareholding, compensation, and analyst forecast of Chinese firms

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  • Wei Huang
  • Agyenim Boateng

Abstract

We examine the impact of executive and leadership shareholding and cash compensation on analyst forecast error and dispersion as proxies for information asymmetry. We find that firms pay higher compensation (or excess compensation) to executives and directors are associated with higher information asymmetry. The positive association is stronger where executives’ and directors’ shareholdings are higher. Shareholding appears to facilitate managerial entrenchment and gives highly paid executives/leadership stronger structural power which adversely affects information disclosure leading to larger forecast error and dispersion. These results are robust to different measures of compensation and alternative models controlling for the predictability of firm-level earnings. Our findings indicate that executive/director shareholding and compensation do not provide sufficient incentives for information disclosure by Chinese firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei Huang & Agyenim Boateng, 2017. "Executive shareholding, compensation, and analyst forecast of Chinese firms," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(15), pages 1459-1472, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:49:y:2017:i:15:p:1459-1472
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2016.1218432
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan & Huang, Hedy Jiaying, 2019. "Tournament incentives and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 93-117.
    2. Ma, Huanyu & Hao, Dapeng, 2022. "Economic policy uncertainty, financial development, and financial constraints: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 368-386.
    3. Tong Sheng & Bingquan Fang & Xiaoqian Lu & Xingheng Shi & Chaohai Shen & Xiaolan Zhou, 2022. "The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility, Global Investment, and Equity Incentives," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(23), pages 1-27, December.
    4. Wei Huang & Tingting Ying & Yun Shen, 2018. "Executive cash compensation and tax aggressiveness of Chinese firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1151-1180, November.
    5. Cheng, Dong & Yu, Jian & Zhang, Dayong & Zheng, Wenping, 2020. "Is heterogeneous capital depreciation important for estimating firm-level productivity? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    6. Jiafeng Gu, 2023. "Firm Performance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Spatial Context and Effect Mechanism," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(1), pages 21582440231, January.

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