IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apeclt/v24y2017i2p75-79.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance in the economic interaction model with local social cost functions

Author

Listed:
  • Yingying Shi
  • Min Pan

Abstract

The evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance in a society with local social cost functions have been discussed. We show that, very different from the global function case studied previously, dynamics of social tolerance in a society with local social cost functions is integrable in phase space. The exact solution of the evolutionary dynamics in phase space is obtained, and the evolutionary trajectories are discussed by using the Kolmogorov–Arnold–Moser theorem. We show that the property of steady states is closely related to the group populations. We also discuss the necessary condition of the full tolerance steady state, and it is demonstrated that both global and local social cost functions have the same necessary condition of achieving full tolerance.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingying Shi & Min Pan, 2017. "Evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance in the economic interaction model with local social cost functions," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(2), pages 75-79, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:24:y:2017:i:2:p:75-79
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1164809
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2016.1164809
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/13504851.2016.1164809?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shi, Yingying & Pan, Min & Peng, Daiyan, 2017. "Replicator dynamics and evolutionary game of social tolerance: The role of neutral agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 10-14.
    2. Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "Entitlement to assort: Democracy, compromise culture and economic stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 146-148.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:24:y:2017:i:2:p:75-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEL20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.