All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces
This article describes all-pay auctions with discrete action spaces and shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria may exist. Such equilibria are shown to be potentially more favourable to both buyers and sellers than the more standard mixed-strategy equilibria, thus suggesting that it can be in the interest of both sides to limit bidders' action spaces.
Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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