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All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces


  • James Boudreau


This article describes all-pay auctions with discrete action spaces and shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria may exist. Such equilibria are shown to be potentially more favourable to both buyers and sellers than the more standard mixed-strategy equilibria, thus suggesting that it can be in the interest of both sides to limit bidders' action spaces.

Suggested Citation

  • James Boudreau, 2011. "All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 161-162.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:2:p:161-162
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850903442954

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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Zheng, 2017. "Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions with discrete strategy space," Economics Discussion Papers 2017-22, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    2. Metzger, Lars Peter, 2014. "Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 160-166.

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