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Why Do French Civil Law Countries Have Higher Levels Of Financial Efficiency

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Listed:
  • Simplice ASONGU

    (University of Li ge HEC Management School Belgium)

Abstract

The dominance of English common law countries in prospects for financial development in the legal origins debate has been debunked by recent findings Using exchange rate regimes and economic monetary integration oriented hypotheses this paper proposes an inflation uncertainty theory in providing theoretical justification and empirical validity as to why French civil law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency Inflation uncertainty typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of financial intermediary institutions in English common law countries As a policy implication results support the benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency

Suggested Citation

  • Simplice ASONGU, 2011. "Why Do French Civil Law Countries Have Higher Levels Of Financial Efficiency," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 2(4), pages 94-108.
    • Handle: RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:94-108
    as

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    JEL classification:

    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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