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Stabile Allokationen und Matching-Märkte

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  • Dorothea Kübler

Abstract

The Nobel prize in economics in 2012 was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth for “the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design” (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences). The prize honours Lloyd Shapley’s theoretical foundations of the theory of stable allocations (in particular the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm) as well as the theoretical and practical contributions to the design of matching markets by Al Roth. As prices do not play their usual role in equating supply and demand, market failure is widespread (congestion, unravelling, lack of thickness). The actual design of two-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical investigations of the market and its rules. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Dorothea Kübler, 2012. "Stabile Allokationen und Matching-Märkte," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;German National Library of Economics, vol. 92(12), pages 843-847, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:92:y:2012:i:12:p:843-847
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-012-1466-0
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    Keywords

    A11; C78; D47;

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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