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Die europäische Tragödie: Ein politisches Ordnungsproblem


  • Ulrich Blum
  • Ingo Pies
  • Nikolaus Sieveking


We argue that self-binding rules in the context of the stabilisation of the eurozone — both monetary and fiscal — are important for a successful long-term European economic policy. The present loss of reputation due to the breaking of fundamental rules such as the no-bailout clause generates high cost, especially with respect to raising money in the financial markets, because no institutional stability and political credibility exist. We propose to install a compliance system similar to what large enterprises have introduced. It would perfectly fit into the system of regulatory principles of the social market economy, but also focus on administrative and implementation issues. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Ulrich Blum & Ingo Pies & Nikolaus Sieveking, 2012. "Die europäische Tragödie: Ein politisches Ordnungsproblem," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;German National Library of Economics, vol. 92(10), pages 667-672, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:92:y:2012:i:10:p:667-672
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-012-1436-6

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    Cited by:

    1. Karl Socher & Ulrich Blum & Hans Heinrich Driftmann, 2012. "Aufspaltung der Universalbanken: Krisenprävention oder gefährlicher Eingriff in das Bankensystem?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(21), pages 03-12, November.

    More about this item


    H11; L51; P16;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism


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