Die europäische Tragödie: Ein politisches Ordnungsproblem
We argue that self-binding rules in the context of the stabilisation of the eurozone — both monetary and fiscal — are important for a successful long-term European economic policy. The present loss of reputation due to the breaking of fundamental rules such as the no-bailout clause generates high cost, especially with respect to raising money in the financial markets, because no institutional stability and political credibility exist. We propose to install a compliance system similar to what large enterprises have introduced. It would perfectly fit into the system of regulatory principles of the social market economy, but also focus on administrative and implementation issues. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
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Volume (Year): 92 (2012)
Issue (Month): 10 (October)
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