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A signaling model of peaceful political change

Author

Listed:
  • Arieh Gavious

    (Faculty of Engineering Sciences, School of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, P.O. Box 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel)

  • Shlomo Mizrahi

    (School of Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel)

Abstract

The interaction between social activists and politicians is modeled by a signaling game in which activists send messages and politicians interpret them, attempting to understand the activists' goals. These goals range between extreme radical and very moderate changes that activists wish to achieve in policy or in the political system. The formal model shows the conditions for equilibrium with separating and pooling regions dependent on the type of social activists and the demands they raise. In the pooling region an activist who wants to achieve a certain degree of radical change sends a false signal, thus possibly leading politicians to enter negotiations under unfavorable conditions. This creates a momentum of peaceful political change.

Suggested Citation

  • Arieh Gavious & Shlomo Mizrahi, 2003. "A signaling model of peaceful political change," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 119-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:1:p:119-136
    Note: Received: 19 February 2001/Accepted: 6 February 2002
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    Cited by:

    1. Xin Feng, 2023. "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 401-421, June.

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