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Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions

Author

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  • V. Feltkamp

    () (International Institute of Infonomics, PO Box 2606, 6401 DC Heerlen, The Netherlands)

  • Javier Arin

    () (Departamento Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Ftad de Económicas, Universidad del Pais Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, L. Agirre etorbidea 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce and study the w-Coalitional Lorenz Solutions to identify the similarities and differences between the prenucleolus and the Shapley value. The similarity is that they both use egalitarian criteria over coalitions. The two main differences are: the prenucleolus and the Shapley value use different egalitarian criteria, and they weight the coalitions differently when applying the criteria.

Suggested Citation

  • V. Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 2002. "Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 869-884.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:869-884 Note: Received: 27 October 2000/Accepted: 2 October 2001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
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    7. Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1998. "Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 297-311.
    8. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier, 2003. "Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion," IKERLANAK 2003-02, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    2. Vincent Iehlé, 2015. "The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 141-151.
    3. Vincent Iehlé, 2015. "The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 141-151.

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