Choice correspondences for public goods
We consider collective choice problems where a group of agents has to decide on the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. A well-known solution for such problems is the coordinatewise median of the reported votes and additional fixed ballots. Instead of adding ballots, we extend the median solution by allowing set-valued outcomes. This especially applies for location problems with an even number of agents.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 14 August 1998/Accepted: 29 August 2000|
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