More on preference and freedom
The paper seeks to formalize the notion of effective freedom or the freedom to realize meaningful choices. The definition of meaningful choice used in this paper is based on the preference orderings that a reasonable person may have. I argue that only alternatives that can be selected by a reasonable person from the set of all possible alternatives provide a meaningful choice. I discuss this approach and provide an axiomatization of the cardinality rule and two lexicographic versions of this rule in this context.
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 24 September 1996/Accepted: 26 January 2000|
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|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
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- Puppe, Clemens, 1996. "An Axiomatic Approach to "Preference for Freedom of Choice"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 174-199, January.
- Prasanta K. PATTANAIK & Yongsheng XU, 1990. "On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1990036, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Jones, Peter & Sugden, Robert, 1982. "Evaluating choice," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 47-65, June.
- Sen, Amartya, 1991. "Welfare, preference and freedom," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1-2), pages 15-29, October.