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Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote: A comment

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  • Randolph Sloof

    (Tinbergen Institute and University of Amsterdam, Department of Economics, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This comment deals with some imperfections of the analysis presented by Austen-Smith and Wright [1]. It is argued that in [1] being informed is incorrectly identified with being informative, yielding an incomplete equilibrium analysis, and leading to bias in the kind of equilibrium behavior predicted. After correcting for this bias, the results obtained corroborate their main conclusion - legislators are often lobbied by just one of two competing groups, typically the a priori disadvantaged group. The comment also strengthens their case for counteractive lobbying; the a priori favored group typically only lobbies to counteract the influence of an opposing group. Another conclusion, however, is qualified; an increase in the groups' stakes can make it less, rather than more, likely that the legislator makes the correct decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Randolph Sloof, 1997. "Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote: A comment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(3), pages 449-464.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:449-464
    Note: Received: 26 January 1996/Accepted: 27 March 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.

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