Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces
In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices are separable and quadratic. It turns out that a voting scheme is strategy-proof if and only if () its range is a closed Cartesian subset of Euclidean space, () the outcomes are at a minimal distance to the outcome under a specific coordinatewise veto voting scheme, and () it satisfies some monotonicity properties. Neither continuity nor decomposability is implied by strategy-proofness, but these are satisfied if we additionally impose Pareto-optimality or unanimity.
Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 18 October 1993/Accepted: 2 February 1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|