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Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces

Author

Listed:
  • T. Storcken

    (Department of Economics, Limburg University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • H. Peters

    (Department of Economics, Limburg University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • H. v. d. Stel

    (Department of Economics, Limburg University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • W. Peremans

    (Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands)

Abstract

In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices are separable and quadratic. It turns out that a voting scheme is strategy-proof if and only if () its range is a closed Cartesian subset of Euclidean space, () the outcomes are at a minimal distance to the outcome under a specific coordinatewise veto voting scheme, and () it satisfies some monotonicity properties. Neither continuity nor decomposability is implied by strategy-proofness, but these are satisfied if we additionally impose Pareto-optimality or unanimity.

Suggested Citation

  • T. Storcken & H. Peters & H. v. d. Stel & W. Peremans, 1997. "Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(3), pages 379-401.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401
    Note: Received: 18 October 1993/Accepted: 2 February 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C., 2020. "The capacity constrained facility location problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 478-490.
    2. Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2019. "Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(2), pages 295-327, February.
    3. Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 219-238.
    4. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June.
    5. Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam & Barton E. Lee & Toby Walsh, 2021. "Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location," Papers 2111.01566, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    6. Saralees Nadarajah, 2009. "The Pareto optimality distribution," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(6), pages 993-998, November.
    7. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.

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