Implementation in generic environments
In this paper, we study implementation in "economic environments". It is shown that there is a dense subset of the set of preference profiles such that given an arbitrary social choice function, f, and >0, there exists another social choice function, f, within of f uniformly and implementable in Nash equilibrium on the dense subset.
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Volume (Year): 13 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Note:||Received: 25 April 1995/Accepted: 23 November 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
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