IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

A note on restricted majority rules: invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness

Listed author(s):
  • Drora Karotkin

    (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

  • Shmuel Nitzan

    (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

Recently, Karotkin (1993) has shown that in the symmetric uncertain dichotomous choice model the set of restricted majority rules (RMRs) is special in the sense that a member of this family of rules is always the worst rule among the potentially optimal weighted majority rules (WMRs). In the current paper we establish two additional special properties of RMRs. First, given a particular configuration of the group members' decisions, the collective choice is invariant to the selection of WMRs if it is invariant to the selection of RMRs. Second, given a particular decision profile, a potentially optimal WMR can result in a distinctive collective choice which is different from the choice of any other potentially optimal WMR, if and only if it is a RMR.

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Article provided by Springer & The Society for Social Choice and Welfare in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 13 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 269-274

in new window

Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:269-274
Note: Received: 6 November 1994/Accepted: 9 May 1995
Contact details of provider: Web page:

Web page:

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:269-274. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Rebekah McClure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.