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A note on restricted majority rules: invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness

Author

Listed:
  • Drora Karotkin

    (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

  • Shmuel Nitzan

    (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

Abstract

Recently, Karotkin (1993) has shown that in the symmetric uncertain dichotomous choice model the set of restricted majority rules (RMRs) is special in the sense that a member of this family of rules is always the worst rule among the potentially optimal weighted majority rules (WMRs). In the current paper we establish two additional special properties of RMRs. First, given a particular configuration of the group members' decisions, the collective choice is invariant to the selection of WMRs if it is invariant to the selection of RMRs. Second, given a particular decision profile, a potentially optimal WMR can result in a distinctive collective choice which is different from the choice of any other potentially optimal WMR, if and only if it is a RMR.

Suggested Citation

  • Drora Karotkin & Shmuel Nitzan, 1996. "A note on restricted majority rules: invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(3), pages 269-274.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:269-274
    Note: Received: 6 November 1994/Accepted: 9 May 1995
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    Cited by:

    1. Karotkin, Drora, 1998. "The Network of Weighted Majority Rules and Weighted Majority Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 299-315, February.
    2. Karotkin, Drora & Schaps, Mary, 2003. "The network of weighted majority rules and its geometric realizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 75-90, January.

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