Die Direktansprache und der Schutz unternehmerischer Rechte: Ökonomische Argumente für eine rechtliche Problematik

Summary Head hunters or executive searchers usually approach potential candidates confidentially on the job and via the infrastructure provided by their current employers. That practice violates, according to a judgement of the Higher Regional Court Stuttgart, the legitimate rights of the current employer. Thus, head hunters are asked by the Court not to approach candidates on the job. As this request has caused great concern in the profession and is disputed by many, the article analyzes the interaction between executive searcher, potential candidate, the target company and the commissioning company through the application of microeconomic theory as well as through the principal-agent and the prisoners dilemma models. While ultimately arguing for the admissibility of executive searchers approaching potential candidates on the job, the analyzes also supports important economic reasons for protecting the property rights of the target company. Via the prisoners dilemma, the analysis points towards the vision of a mutually beneficial institutional arrangement that protects the legitimate rights of the target company, while still enabling the interaction between the employee and the executive researcher.