IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v54y2025i2d10.1007_s00182-025-00962-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Generalizing liquid democracy to multi-agent delegation: a voting weight measure and equilibrium analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco M. Bersetche

    (FCEyN, Universidad de Buenos Aires
    Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María)

Abstract

In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to partition and delegate their votes to multiple representatives, all while retaining a fraction of the voting weight for themselves. We introduce a penalty mechanism for the length of delegation chains. We discuss the desirable properties of a reasonable generalization of the classic model, and prove that smaller penalty factors bring the model closer to satisfying these properties. In the subsequent section, we explore the presence of equilibrium states in a general delegation game utilizing the proposed voting measure. In contrast to the classical model, we demonstrate that this game exhibits Nash equilibria, contingent upon the imposition of a penalty on the length of delegation chains.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco M. Bersetche, 2025. "Generalizing liquid democracy to multi-agent delegation: a voting weight measure and equilibrium analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(2), pages 1-35, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00962-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00962-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-025-00962-2
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-025-00962-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00962-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.