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Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations

Author

Listed:
  • Toru Hokari
  • Anita Gellekom

Abstract

On the domain of convex games, many desirable properties of solutions are compatible and there are many single-valued solutions that are intuitively appealing. We establish some interesting logical relations among properties of single-valued solutions. In particular, we introduce a new property, weak contribution-monotonicity, and show that this property is a key property that links other properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and dummy-player-out. Copyright Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Toru Hokari & Anita Gellekom, 2003. "Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(4), pages 593-607, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2003:i:4:p:593-607
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820300141
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    Cited by:

    1. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2018. "Weak fairness and the Shapley value," Working Papers 2072/306979, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Bas Dietzenbacher & Peter Sudhölter, 2022. "Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 413-429, June.

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