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A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles


  • Antonio Quesada

    () (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo , Spain. Fax number: +34-968-36-3758. E-mail address: Web page:


It is shown that no solution concept that selects sequentially rational (perfect, proper, persistent, or members of some stable set of) equilibria satisfies the following consistency property. Suppose that in every solution of the game G, player i's action is a, and denote by Ga the game in which player i is restricted to choose a. Then some player j\neqi has an action c that is used with positive probability in both some solution of G and some solution of Ga. This result illustrates a conflict between a mild consistency condition and sequential rationality.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Quesada, 2002. "A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(1), pages 13-18.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:13-18
    Note: Received: January 2001/Final version: April 2002

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    Cited by:

    1. Diego Lanzi, 2010. "Embedded choices," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 263-280, March.


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