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Stay-in-a-set games

Author

Listed:
  • Piercesare Secchi

    (Dipartimento di Matematica, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, 20133 Milano, Italy)

  • William D. Sudderth

    (School of Statistics, University of Minnesota, Church Street SE 224, 55455 Minneapolis, USA)

Abstract

There exists a Nash equilibrium (-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each player i is one when the process of states remains in a given set of states Gi and is zero otherwise.

Suggested Citation

  • Piercesare Secchi & William D. Sudderth, 2002. "Stay-in-a-set games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(4), pages 479-490.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:479-490
    Note: Received: December 2000
    as

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