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Cooperative Processing of Information via Choice at an Information Set

Author

Listed:
  • Ichiishi, Tatsuro
  • Idzik, Adam
  • Zhao, Jingang

Abstract

A specific structure is added to the model of Bayesian society, and the associated (more involved) version of the Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium concept is proposed. The equilibrium endogenously explains whether or not player j in coalition S, in pursuit of his self-interest, decides to pass on his private information to the other members of S, and if he does which part of his private information he decides to pass on. Generic existence theorems for this equilibrium are established.

Suggested Citation

  • Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam & Zhao, Jingang, 1994. "Cooperative Processing of Information via Choice at an Information Set," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(2), pages 145-165.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:145-65
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sakaki, Yuki, 2006. "A Note on the Core of a Profit-Center Game with Incomplete Information and Increasing Returns to Scale," Discussion Papers 2006-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

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