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Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation


  • Luca Lambertini



I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Lambertini, 2005. "Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 443-465, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:15:y:2005:i:4:p:443-465 DOI: 10.1007/s00191-005-0263-y

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," NBER Chapters,in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 51-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 323-351, March.
    3. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Mazzoleni, Roberto & Nelson, Richard R., 1998. "The benefits and costs of strong patent protection: a contribution to the current debate," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 273-284, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. L. Lambertini, 2005. "Dynamic Oligopoly ˆ la Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 547, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    2. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & G. Leitmann & A. Palestini, 2009. "A Stochastic Optimal Control Model of Pollution Abatement," Working Papers 681, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.


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