# The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games

Listed:
• Lin Zhou

()

## Abstract

In this paper I study a class of two-player games, in which both players’ action sets are [0,1] and their payoff functions are continuous in joint actions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset A of $[0,1]\times [0,1]$ to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

## Suggested Citation

• Lin Zhou, 2005. "The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(2), pages 301-308, August.
• Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:301-308
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0560-y
as

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-004-0560-y

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

## Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as

Cited by:

1. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.

### Keywords

Nash equilibrium; Revealed preferences.;

## Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:301-308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.