Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a communication equilibrium based on such mediation when monitoring is jointly $\epsilon$ -perfect in the sense that every player is almost perfectly monitored collectively by other players. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (02)
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