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Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets

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  • Michel Breton
  • Shlomo Weber

Abstract

In this paper we consider a model of group formation where group of individuals may have different feasible sets. We focus on two polar cases, increasing returns, when the set of feasible alternatives increases if a new member joins the group, and decreasing returns, when a new member has an opposite effect and reduces the number of alternatives available for the enlarged group. We examine two notions, stability and strong stability of group structures, that correspond to Nash and Strong Nash equilibrium of the associated non-cooperative game, and identify the classes of stable and strongly stable environments. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2005. "Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(1), pages 187-201, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:187-201
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0494-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2023. "Citizen preferences and the architecture of government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 537-585, October.
    2. Ulrich Faigle & Michel Grabisch, 2012. "Values for Markovian coalition processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 505-538, November.
    3. Clempner, Julio B. & Poznyak, Alexander S., 2015. "Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 265(C), pages 911-927.
    4. Braouezec, Yann, 2012. "Customer-class pricing, parallel trade and the optimal number of market segments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 605-614.

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