Demand Deposit Contracts, Suspension of Convertibility, and Optimal Financial Intermediation
This paper establishes that an optical contract, combining features of well-known Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Townsend (1979,1983) models, resembles banking. The contract and the associated allocations are derived from a social planner's problem which contains the Diamond and Dybvig and Townsend models as sub-problems. The analysis accomplishes the following. It unites the liquidity preference and cost minimization literatures in a simple way; resolves the demand deposit/demand equity problem in the Diamond and Dybvig model; introduces a notion of efficient bankruptcies into the liquidity preference literature; and raises some questions about the government regulation vs. laissez faire banking debate.
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Volume (Year): 1 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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