Bounding the benefits of stochastic auditing: The case of risk-neutral agents
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More about this item
KeywordsStochastic auditing · Costly state verification model · Risk neutrality.;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
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