Coinage, debasements, and Gresham's laws
This paper formulates a model of commodity money that circulates by tale, and applies it to a variety of situations, some of which seem to confirm, and others to contradict, `Gresham's Law'. We analyze how debasements could prompt decisions of citizens voluntarily to participate in recoinages that subjected them to seigniorage taxes.
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Volume (Year): 10 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: December 19, 1994; revised version August 1, 1996|
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