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Environmental Policies in a Polluting Duopoly: A Simple Comparison

Author

Listed:
  • Domenico Buccella

    (Kozminski University)

  • Luciano Fanti

    (University of Pisa)

  • Luca Gori

    (University of Pisa)

Abstract

In a polluting Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods, this work compares the environmental, public finance and welfare impacts of three policies: an emissions tax, an abatement subsidy, and a policy mix. A subsidy, alone or coupled with a tax, always increases abatement; however, taxation disincentivises production, leading to decreased environmental damage, which positively affects welfare. Except for a rather inefficient technology, the emissions tax produces the lowest environmental damage; this positive effect, jointly with the tax revenues the government collects, more than offsets the negative impact on profits and consumer surplus due to output contraction, leading to the highest welfare. Only when societal awareness is negligible and technology is inefficient does the government design a policy providing a subsidy.

Suggested Citation

  • Domenico Buccella & Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2025. "Environmental Policies in a Polluting Duopoly: A Simple Comparison," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 11(3), pages 1387-1412, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:italej:v:11:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s40797-024-00277-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40797-024-00277-3
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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