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A new framework for fiscal policy consolidation in Europe

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  • Peter Bofinger
  • Stefan Ried

Abstract

Current developments in Greece make clear that the rules of the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were neither strict enough nor enforced strictly enough. To deal with the ongoing fiscal exit and its related phenomena of crisis, we propose a new framework for fiscal policy consolidation in Europe. Centre stage takes a European Consolidation Pact (ECP) supplementing the SGP, with five distinguishing features. First, members are obliged to detail a path to balancing their budgets, including a concrete course to cutting non-cyclical government expenditure, and second to implement an automatic tax increase law in case of straying from the defined path. Third, pact members may apply for ECP guarantees for each newly issued government debt that is in line with the specified path. These guarantees are, fourth, paid for by a percentage fee. Fifth, non-compliance with the automatic tax increase law or voluntary exit from the consolidation pact leaves future government bond issues without ECP guarantees: either the country does not need the guarantee any longer, or it is willing to default. In the latter case, the new framework spells out the details of an orderly government default.
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Suggested Citation

  • Peter Bofinger & Stefan Ried, 2010. "A new framework for fiscal policy consolidation in Europe," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 45(4), pages 203-211, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:intere:v:45:y:2010:i:4:p:203-211
    DOI: 10.1007/s10272-010-0338-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    2. Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Rettung durch eine beschränkte Garantie," Munich Reprints in Economics 22080, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Sachs, 2013. "Governance Structures in Europe," WWWforEurope Deliverables series 2, WWWforEurope.
    2. Torój, Andrzej & Bednarek, Elżbieta & Bęza-Bojanowska, Joanna & Osińska, Joanna & Waćko, Katarzyna & Witkowski, Dariusz, 2012. "EMU: the (post-)crisis perspective. Literature survey and implications for the euro-candidates," MF Working Papers 12, Ministry of Finance in Poland, revised 06 Mar 2012.
    3. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (ed.), 2010. "Chancen für einen stabilen Aufschwung. Jahresgutachten 2010/11," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201011.
    4. Gustav A. Horn & Torsten Niechoj & Silke Tober & Till van Treeck & Achim Truger, 2010. "Reform des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts: Nicht nur öffentliche, auch private Verschuldung zählt," IMK Report 51-2010, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    5. Gustav A. Horn & Torsten Niechoj & Silke Tober & Till van Treeck & Achim Truger, 2010. "Reforming the European Stability and Growth Pact: Public Debt is Not the Only Factor, Private Debt Counts as Well," IMK Report 51e-2010, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    6. Árpád Kovács & Péter Halmosi, 2012. "Similarities and Differences in European Crisis Management," Public Finance Quarterly, State Audit Office of Hungary, vol. 57(1), pages 9-27.
    7. Colignatus, Thomas, 2011. "Conditions for turning the ex ante risk premium into an ex post redemption for EU government debt," MPRA Paper 34816, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Nov 2011.
    8. Bas van Aarle, 2013. "Surveillance and Control of Fiscal Consolidation on a Supranational Level," WWWforEurope Working Papers series 46, WWWforEurope.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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