Opcja domyslna jako bodziec w ksztaltowaniu decyzji jednostek w warunkach konkurencji i wspolpracy – badanie eksperymentalne

Purpose: Overbidding in competitive settings leads to resource wastage and limits potential social benefits from cooperation. This study examines how the prize structure of two types of tournaments, winner-take-all (WTA) and proportional prize (PP), and default options as behavioural nudges influence expenditure levels among paired participants. The obtained results can have practical applications in designing competitive mechanisms, such as incentive programs in organizations, to minimize resource waste and promote more efficient participant behaviour. Methodology: The laboratory experiment involved 78 participants competing in pairs across four conditions: WTA and PP, with or without default options. Data were analyzed regarding expenditures. Results: Default options reduced expenditures in WTA tournaments but increased them in PP settings. Decision dynamics were influenced by prior rounds’ spending and pair interactions. Limitations/Implications: The study’s relatively small sample size limits the generalizability of the findings. The results emphasize that behavioural interventions must be context-specific to avoid counterproductive effects. Originality/Value: The study provides new insights into the effectiveness of default options in competitive environments, offering practical guidance for designing more efficient decisionmaking systems.