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Behavioral ethics meets natural justice

Author

Listed:
  • Herbert Gintis

    (Santa Fe Institute, USA; Central European University, Hungary)

Abstract

Binmore's Natural Justice offers an evolutionary approach to morality, in which moral rules form a cultural system that is robust and evolutionarily stable. The folk theorem is the analytical basis for his theory of justice. I argue that this is a mistake, as the equilibria described by the folk theorem lack dynamic stability in games with several players. While the dependence of Binmore's argument on the folk theorem is more tactical than strategic, this choice does have policy implications. I do not believe that moral rules are solutions to the Nash bargaining problem. Rather, I believe that human beings are emotionally constituted, by virtue of their evolutionary history, to embrace prosocial and altruistic notions of in-group–out-group identification and reciprocity. These aspects of human nature are incompatible with Binmore's notion that humans are self-regarding creatures. I present empirical evidence supporting a specific form of human, other-regarding preferences known as strong reciprocity.

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert Gintis, 2006. "Behavioral ethics meets natural justice," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 5-32, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:5:y:2006:i:1:p:5-32
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X06060617
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Creutzig, Felix, 2020. "Limits to Liberalism: Considerations for the Anthropocene," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    2. Francesco GUALA, 2010. "Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate," Departmental Working Papers 2010-23, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    3. Tamar Kugler & Edgar E. Kausel & Martin G. Kocher, 2012. "Are Groups more Rational than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 3701, CESifo.
    4. Jung-Kyoo Choi & Jun Sok Huhh, 2021. "Behavioral Mistakes Support Cooperation in an N-Person Repeated Public Goods Game," Papers 2106.15994, arXiv.org.
    5. Irene van Staveren, 2012. "An Evolutionary Efficiency Alternative to the Notion of Pareto Efficiency," Economic Thought, World Economics Association, vol. 1(1), pages 1-6, July.
    6. Francesco Guala, 2010. "Cooperation in and out of the lab: a comment on Binmore’s paper," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 9(2), pages 159-169, December.
    7. Yohsuke Murase & Seung Ki Baek, 2021. "Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, January.

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