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Offense-Defense Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Yoav Gortzak
  • Yoram Z. Haftel
  • Kevin Sweeney

    (Department of Political Science, Ohio State University)

Abstract

Proponents of offense-defense theory (ODT) contend that the offense-defense balance (ODB) forms the “master key†to understanding the question of peace and war. Time-series event count models of war and militarized interstate disputes at the systemic level are used to test the theory’s claims that shifts in the ODB have an important effect on the likelihood of internationalwar and militarized disputes and thatODToffers a more powerful explanation for conflict than other explanations in the international relations (IR) literature. Results cast doubt on the empirical validity of the ODT and indicate that other IR theories have important explanatory power.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoav Gortzak & Yoram Z. Haftel & Kevin Sweeney, 2005. "Offense-Defense Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(1), pages 67-89, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:49:y:2005:i:1:p:67-89
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002704271280
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Pollins, Brian M., 1996. "Global Political Order, Economic Change, and Armed Conflict: Coevolving Systems and the Use of Force," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 103-117, March.
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