IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v42y1998i2p156-175.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik

Author

Listed:
  • Susan G. Sample

    (Department of Political Science, Middlebury College)

Abstract

This article examines the role of mutual military buildups in dispute escalation to war. It is argued that the effect of the pervasive realist culture in the modern state system is to affect policy choices and perceptions in ways that alter the dynamics of militarized disputes when the countries are arming, thus raising the chance that war will be the outcome of the dispute. Previous tests of the connection between arming and escalation have been fraught with methodological controversy and have been inconclusive in their conclusions. By contrast, this study is multivariate; it incorporates other factors that might have a strong influence on arming, escalation, or both. The findings indicate that when those factors are considered (including the issue in contention, history of disputes, and relative defense burdens as well as relative power balance), preceding mutual military buildups are strongly and positively related to the likelihood of dispute escalation.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan G. Sample, 1998. "Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(2), pages 156-175, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:2:p:156-175
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042002002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002798042002002
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002798042002002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James D. Fearon, 1994. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 236-269, June.
    2. Ostrom, Charles W., 1978. "A Reactive Linkage Model of the U.S. Defense Expenditure Policymaking Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 941-957, September.
    3. Ward, Michael Don, 1984. "Differential Paths to Parity: A Study of the Contemporary Arms Race," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 297-317, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael D. McGinnis, 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(3), pages 443-473, September.
    2. Benjamin O. Fordham, 2004. "A Very Sharp Sword," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(5), pages 632-656, October.
    3. Clayton L. Thyne, 2006. "Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(6), pages 937-961, December.
    4. Michael D. Ward & Alex Mintz, 1987. "Dynamics of Military Spending in Israel," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 86-105, March.
    5. Paul K. Huth, 1998. "Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 744-770, December.
    6. Jesse C. Johnson & Brett Ashley Leeds & Ahra Wu, 2015. "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 309-336, March.
    7. Seok Joon Kim, 2022. "Quick on the Draw: American Negativity Bias and Costly Signals in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(2), pages 246-271, February.
    8. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Winning with the Bomb," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 278-301, April.
    9. Renato Corbetta, 2015. "Between indifference and coercion: Third-party intervention techniques in ongoing disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(1), pages 3-27, February.
    10. Ben D. Mor & Zeev Maoz, 1999. "Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: a Strategic Approach," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 1-48, February.
    11. Brandon J Kinne, 2014. "Does third-party trade reduce conflict? Credible signaling versus opportunity costs," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 28-48, February.
    12. William R. Thompson & Karen A. Rasler, 1988. "War and Systemic Capability Reconcentration," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(2), pages 335-366, June.
    13. Brian Lai, 2004. "The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 211-229, April.
    14. Chyanda Querido, 2007. "A Game Theoretic Approach of War," EcoMod2007 23900073, EcoMod.
    15. Serdar Ş. Güner, 2004. "Aegean Territorial Waters Conflict: An Evolutionary Narrative," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(4), pages 297-312, September.
    16. Marco Serena, 2019. "A Game-Free Microfoundation of Mutual Optimism," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, September.
    17. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.
    18. Patrick M. Regan, 1996. "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(2), pages 336-359, June.
    19. James Meernik, 1999. "Force and Influence in International Crises," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 103-131, February.
    20. Justin Conrad & Hong-Cheol Kim & Mark Souva, 2013. "Narrow interests and military resource allocation in autocratic regimes," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 50(6), pages 737-750, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:2:p:156-175. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.