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Experiments with N-Person Social Traps II

Author

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  • Anatol Rapoport

    (University College, University of Toronto)

Abstract

A version of the Tragedy of the Commons was played by 16 four-person groups, 2 three-person groups, and 1 two-person group. Calculation of individually rational equilibria for the seven-round game was out of the question. The collectively rational strategy, on the other hand, is salient: No one is to draw from the common resource pool for the first six rounds, allowing the pool to double each round; then each is to claim an equal share of the pool, which has increasedby by a factor of 64. The game was presented under two conditions: minimal and full instructions, the latter including the disclosure of the collectively rational strategy. None of the four-person groups and neither of the two three-person groups achieved the optimal result. Only the single two-person group cooperated all the way, refraining from drawing from the pool until the last round and harvesting $38.40 on the final round. This pair was given the full instructions. Full instructions did have a positive effect, however, raising the level of cooperation as measured by several indices.

Suggested Citation

  • Anatol Rapoport, 1988. "Experiments with N-Person Social Traps II," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(3), pages 473-488, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:32:y:1988:i:3:p:473-488
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002788032003004
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    Cited by:

    1. Guererk, Oezguer & Rockenbach, Bettina & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2010. "The effects of punishment in dynamic public-good games," MPRA Paper 22097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bernauer, Thomas & Nguyen, Quynh, 2014. "Trust in trade: The causal role of social trust on individual trade preferences," Papers 740, World Trade Institute.
    3. Stefano Moroni, 2015. "Beni di nessuno, beni di alcuni, beni di tutti: note critiche sull?incerto paradigma dei beni comuni," SCIENZE REGIONALI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(3), pages 137-144.
    4. Wojtek Przepiorka & Andreas Diekmann, 2020. "Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-21, January.
    5. Eliseo Luis Vilalta-Perdomo & Rebecca Herron, 2018. "Individual Actions as Community Informative Resources. A Collective Informative Systems Approach," Systemic Practice and Action Research, Springer, vol. 31(6), pages 581-598, December.

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